–одилс€ √урам ѕирцхалава, актер.
”мер —ерго ќрджоникидзе, де€тель партии, нарком т€желой промышленности.
–одилс€ –езо Ёсадзе, грузинский и российский режиссер, сценарист и актер.
авказский фронт. ¬ бою с грузинскими войсками у с.÷ители-÷каро погиб ком. Ёриванской гр.войск 11ј ѕ. урышко. √руппа войск ћ.¬еликанова 11ј ј.√еккера захватила позиции грузинских войск на оджорских и ягулджинских высотах, но к вечеру была выбита с них контратаками противника.
”мер јкакий ÷еретели, поэт.
ƒобавил: Dancho Danchev on 12 —ент, 2008 г. - 05:14
¬ оригинальной версии на сайте http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1670 можно найти скриншоты атак которые проводили российские спецслужбы против √рузии. “акие атаки готов€тс€ не один день.
August 11th, 2008
Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress
Posted by Dancho Danchev @ 4:23 pm
Categories: Hackers, Botnets, Black Hat, Governments, Denial of Service (DoS), Russia, Malware
Tags: Security, Cyber Warfare, DDoS, Georgia, South Osetia, Dancho Danchev
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In the wake of the Russian-Georgian conflict, a week worth of speculations around Russian Internet forums have finally materialized into a coordinated cyber attack against GeorgiaТs Internet infrastructure. The attacks have already managed to compromise several government web sites, with continuing DDoS attacks against numerous other Georgian government sites, prompting the government to switch to hosting locations to the U.S, with GeorgiaТs Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertaking a desperate step in order to disseminate real-time information by moving to a Blogspot account.
WhoТs behind it? The infamous Russian Business Network, or literally every Russian supporting RussiaТs actions? How coordinated and planned is the cyber attack? And do we actually have a relatively decent example of cyber warfare combining PSYOPs (psychological operations) and self-mobilization of the local Internet users by spreading УFor our motherland, brothers!Ф or УYour country is calling you!Ф hacktivist messages across web forums. LetТs find out, in-depth.
The attacks originally starting to take place several weeks before the actual УinterventionФ with Georgia PresidentТs web site coming under DDoS attack from Russian hackers in July, followed by active discussions across the Russian web on whether or not DDoS attacks and web site defacements should in fact be taking place, which would inevitably come as a handy tool to be used against Russian from Western or Pro-Western journalists. The peak of DDoS attack and the actual defacements started taking place as of Friday:
УSeveral Georgian state computer servers have been under external control since shortly before RussiaТs armed intervention into the state commenced on Friday, leaving its online presence in dissaray. While the official website of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian President, has become available again, the central government site, as well as the homepages for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence , remain down. Some commercial websites have also been hijacked.
The Georgian Government said that the disruption was caused by attacks carried out by Russia as part of the ongoing conflict between the two states over the Georgian province of South Ossetia. In a statement released via a replacement website built on GoogleТs blog-hosting service, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: УA cyber warfare campaign by Russia is seriously disrupting many Georgian websites, including that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Ф
After defacing Mikheil SaakashviliТs web site and integrating a slideshow portraying Saakashvili as Hitler next to coming up with identical images of both Saakashvili and HitlerТs public appearances, the site remains under a sustained DDoS attack. ItТs also interesting to point out that the an average script kiddie wouldnТt bother, or wouldnТt even understand the PSYOPs effect of coming up with identical gestures of both parties and integrating them within the defaced sites.
What am I trying to imply? It smells like a three letter intelligence agencyТs propaganda arm has managed to somehow supply the creative for the defacement of Georgia PresidentТs official web site, thereby forgetting a simple rule of engagement in such a conflict - risk forwarding the responsibility of the attack to each and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked Georgian sites using publicly obtainable DDoS attack tools in a coordinated fashion.
The DDoS attacks are so sustained that Georgian PresidentТs web site has recently moved to Atlanta :
УThe original servers located in the country of Georgia were Уflooded and blocked by RussiansФ over the weekend, Nino Doijashvili, chief executive of Atlanta-based hosting company Tulip Systems Inc., said Monday.
The Georgian-born Doijashvili happened to be on vacation in Georgia when fighting broke out on Friday. She cold-called the government to offer her help and transferred president.gov.ge and rustavi2.com, the Web site of a prominent Georgian TV station, to her companyТs servers Saturday.Ф
More defacements of news sites and popular Georgian portals started taking place as well :
УTwo news websites run by breakaway South Ossetia were hacked on Tuesday morning, officials from the secessionist authorities said. The front page of the website of the news agency, OSinform - osinform.ru - which is run by the breakaway regionТs state radio and television station IR - retained the agencyТs header and logo, but otherwize the entire page was featuring Alania TVТs website content, including its news and images. Alania TV is supported by the Georgian government, and targets audiences in the breakaway region. Another website of the breakaway regionТs radio and television station - osradio.ru Ц was also hacked. Alania TV has denied any involvement, saying it was itself surprised to see its content on the rival news agencyТs website.Ф
Ironically, shortly after Civil.ge ran the story, it came under DDoS attack, and Ч just like GeorgiaТs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ч it switched to a Blogger account in case the site remained unavailable. Moreover, the Shadowserver posted more details on the command and control servers used in the DDoS attacks, which geolocate back to Turkey and continue to remain online.
УWith the recent events in Georgia, we are now seeing new attacks against .ge sites. www.parliament.ge & president.gov.ge are currently being hit with http floods. In this case, the C&C server involved is at IP address 220.127.116.11 which is located in Turkey. We are also observing this C&C as directing attacks against www.skandaly .ru. Traffic from your network to this IP or domain name of googlecomaolcomyahoocomaboutcom .net may indicate compromise and participation in these attacks.Ф
As always, this is just the tip of the iceberg, since on 18.104.22.168 we also have several other parked botnet command and control locations, like the following :
LetТs analyze the exact way in which the coordinated cyber attack was planned, a weekendТs worth of monitoring their activities :
- distribute a static list of targets, eliminate centralized coordination of the attack
Who was the only person ever arrested for participating in the Russian vs Estonia cyber Уshock and aweФ attack? A student who distributed a publicly available list of Estonian government web sites. In the ongoing Russian vs Georgia cyber war, we also have an indication of such lists actively distributed across Russian web forums. And now that the targets to be attacked are publicly known, itТs all up to the self-mobilization of the Russian Internet users.
As always, next to the hardcore hacktivists participating in the attack, there are the copycat script kiddies who seem to have found a way to enjoy the media interest into the individuals behind it. Sadly, they have no idea what theyТre doing, nor how to do it. HereТs one such group, stopgeorgia.ru/stopgeorgia.info :
УWe - the representatives of Russian hako-underground, will not tolerate provocation by the Georgian in all its manifestations. We want to live in a free world, but exist in a free-aggression and lies Setevom space. We do not need the guidance from the authorities or other persons, and operates in accordance with their beliefs based on patriotism, conscience and belief. You can call us criminals and cyber-terrorists, razvyazyvaya with war and killing people. But we will fight and unacceptable aggression against Russia in Space Network. We demand the cessation of attacks on information and government resources Runeta, as well as appeal to all media and journalists with a request to cover events objectively. Until the situation has changed, we will attack the Georgian government and information resources. Do not we have launched an information war, we are not responsible for its consequences. We call for the assistance of all who care about the lies of Georgian political sites, everyone who is able to inhibit the spread of black information. There is one formal mirror project - www.stopgeorgia.info. All other resources have nothing to do with the movement StopGeorgia.ru.
DRAFT IS UNDER WWW.STOPGEORGIA.RU. IN CASE OF USE NEDOSTUPNOSTI MIRROR PROJECT - WWW.STOPGEORGIA.INFO.Ф
- engaging the average internet users, empower them with DoS tools
Following a basic cyber warfare rule, that the masses are sometimes more powerful than the botnet masterТs willingness to sacrifice hundreds and thousands of his bots, the current campaign has also thought of the average Internet users who are encouraged to use a plain simple HTTP flooder distributed for this purpose. The concept is nothing new; in fact, this is state of the art cyber warfare combining all the success factors for total outsourcing of the bandwidth capacity and legal responsibility to the average Internet user. Moreover, next to the do-it-yourself tools released, end users who are not so technologically sophisticated are given instructions on how to ping flood Georgian government web sites
- distribute lists of remotely SQL injectable Georgian sites
The last time we witnessed such a tactic aiming to achieve a great deal of efficiency by basically integrating a list of remotely SQL injectable sites into a web site defacement tool, was in MayТs cyber conflict where Pro-Serbian hacktivists were attacking Albanian web sites by doing exactly the same thing. Surprisingly, Russian hackers have also started distributing lists of Georgian sites vulnerable to remote SQL injections, allowing them to automatically deface them
- abuse public lists of email addresses of Georgian politicians for spamming and targeted attacks
As it appears, a publicly available list of Georgian politics originally created by a lobbying organization, has started to circulate in an attempt to convince Russian hackers of the potential for abusing it in spamming attacks and targeted attacks presumably serving malware through live exploit URLs
- destroy the adversaryТs ability to communicate using the usual channels
ItТs been a while since IТve last seen such a pro-active attempt to deny Georgian hackers the ability to communicate though their usual channels. One of GeorgiaТs most popular hacking forums has been down for over 24 hours and continues to be under a permanent DDoS attack on behalf of Russian hackers who have on purposely raised the issue of ensuring that they are unable to reach the local hacktivists and one another. No matter the attack, one should never underestimate otherТs peopleТs ability to adapt to a certain situation - The Russian News and Information Agency - RIA Novost, was also a DDoS attack on Sunday :
УRIA Novosti news agencyТs website was disabled for several hours on Sunday by a series of hacker attacks, as the conflict between Russia and Georgia over breakaway South Ossetia continued for a third day. Websites in both Russia and Georgia have been hit by cyber attacks since Georgia launched a major ground and air offensive to seize control of South Ossetia on Friday. Russia responded by sending in tanks and hundreds of troops. УThe DNS-servers and the site itself have been coming under severe attack,Ф said Maxim Kuznetsov, head of the RIA Novosti IT department. RIA NovostiТs servers are now functioning as normal.Ф
The aggressiveness of the attacks is prone to accelerate in the next couple of days, due to the combination of the attacks tactics used, engaging even the less technical hacktivists next to the more sophisticated botnet master. Realizing whatТs coming, Estonia has informally offered help to Georgia :
УEstonian officials say that the DDoS attacks targeted against Georgia were very similar to the attacks made against Estonian websites in 2007 after the removal of the Bronze Soldier monument. Unofficially, Estonia and Georgia have been discussing the possibility to send a special team of online security specialists to Georgia. A representative of the Development Centre of State Information Systems said that by now Georgia has not yet made a formal proposal. УThis will be decided by the government,Ф said the official.Ф
WhoТs behind this campaign at the bottom line? As weТve already established a connection with well known provider of botnet services in the previous attack against Georgia PresidentТs web site, a connection made possible to establish due to a minor mistake on behalf of the people behind the attack, thereТs no connection with the current attacks and the Russian Business Network, unless of course you define the Russian Business Network as the script kiddies and the dozen of botnet masters paricipating who have somehow managed to build their botnets using RBN services in the past, and are now using them against GeorgiaТs Internet infrastructure.
Overall, contingency planning in times when you need to spread a message about whatТs going in your country, but have you official government sites logically the de facto information sources in such cases shut down, is crucial for reaching out to the rest of the world who would disseminate the message using the long tail. Then again, this is perhaps the first time in such a cyber conflict Цaiming to deny the targeted countryТs ability to reach the world with real-time information on the real-life warfare events Ч where the targeted country is urging others to obtain this information through a third country PresidentТs web site, in this case Poland, and using a blog to do so.
Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence gathering, malware and E-crime incident response. Dancho is also involved in business development, marketing research and competitive intelligence as an independent contractor. He's been an active security blogger since 2007, and maintains a popular security blog sharing real-time threats intelligence data with the rest of the community on a daily basis.